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A critical discourse-analytical and pragma-dialectical perspective 
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University of Bucharest 
 
 
In this article I analyse differences in the legitimation strategies used by, and on behalf 
of the two presidential candidates in the elections of December 2004 in Romania, 
using a combination of Critical Discourse Analysis and pragma-dialectics. These 
differences are seen to lie primarily in the varieties of populist discourse that were 
drawn upon in the construction of legitimizing arguments for both candidates: a 
paternalist type vs. a radical, anti-political type of populism. I relate the success of the 
latter type to more effective strategic maneuvering in argumentation, part of more 
effective branding strategies in general, but also to existing types of political culture 
amongst the electorate and to social, economic circumstances. In CDA terms, I discuss 
WKH³%ăVHVFXEUDQG´DVLQYROYLQJFKRLFHVDWWKHOHvel of discourse, genre and style; in 
pragma-dialectical terms, I view its success as partly the effect of successful strategic 
maneuvering (and of choices at the level of topic, means of adaptation to the audience 
and presentational devices). I also place the success of this brand within the Romanian 
context at the end of 2004, where often questionable  populist electoral messages were 
perceived as reasonable and acceptable, as fitting adjustments to the situation and even 
as means of optimizing the deliberative situation of the electorate. 
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legitimation strategies, populism, political culture, pragma-dialectics, presidential 
elections, strategic maneuvering  
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Introduction 
 
In recent research I have analysed various aspects of “transition” in post-communist 
5RPDQLD ,HĠFX 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c ,HĠFX-Fairclough forthcoming) and this 
paper is a contribution to this line of work, with a focus on electoral discourse in the 
2004 presidential campaign.1 Methodologically, the paper combines Critical 
Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1989, 1992, 2000, 2003, 2006, Wodak et al. 1999, etc.) 
with a particular theory of argumentation, pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 1992, 2004, van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002, etc.), an approach which 
I started developing in ,HĠFXD2  
 One of my particular concerns here is with aspects of “political marketing” 
(Newman 1999), i.e. the post-1989 restructuring of the political field as a form of 
market or “quasi-market” and the appropriation (recontextualization) within it of 
techniques of marketing and advertising, such as “branding”, leading to changes in 
political discourse, political genres and the identities of politicians. I analyse electoral 
material from the final television debate between the two candidates who reached the 
second round of the election: Traian BăVHVFX IRUPHUO\ 0D\RU RI %XFKDUHVW WKH
candidate of the “Alliance for Justice and Truth” ($OLDQĠD '$., i.e. the National-
Liberal and the Democratic Party) who eventually won the presidential election, albeit 
by a narrow margin (51.23% of the votes); and Adrian 1ăVWDVH48.77%), the candidate 
of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), who had been Prime Minister in the previous 
government. The 2004 election was fought by the Social Democrats on the basis of 
their allegedly satisfactory record in government between 2000 and 2004, including a 
significant growth in GDP (8%), successful entry into NATO, and substantial progress 
towards membership of the EU. The “Alliance for Justice and Truth” fought the 
election mainly on the issue of corruption, which they associated primarily with the 
PSD and their allies – a political and economic oligarchy with roots in Romania’s 
communist past. 
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Theoretical framework 
 
 Branding 
 
One innovative element in the 2004 election was the application of the strategy of 
“branding” in Băsescu’s campaign. In an interview shortly after the elections, GMP 
Advertising GLUHFWRU)HOL[7ăWDUX, who was responsible for the campaign, claimed that 
BăVHVFX was the first Romanian politician to be treated as a “brand”. The branding 
strategies that weUHXVHG WRFRQVWUXFW%ăVHVFXDVDSROLWLFLDQ LQYROYHGFXWWLQJDFURVV
boundaries which conventionally separated the field of politics from the fields of 
popular entertainment, commercial advertising and from everyday life, through an 
interdiscursive hybridity (Fairclough 1992, 2003, 2006) which articulated together a 
wider range of communicative resources than were  normally found in Romanian 
politics. The campaign for the re-HOHFWLRQRI%ăVHVFXDV0D\RURI%XFKDUHVWHDUOLHULQ
2004, for example, had the character of a humorous commercial advertising campaign 
LQZKLFK%ăVHVFXZDVV\PEROL]HGDVDUHGFKLOOLSHSSHUardei iute), a symbol which 
evoked his tendency to flare up at unpredictable moments, suggested that he adds spice 
to Romanian politics, that he is fast and efficient, that his presence is inconvenient and 
irritating to the political establishment, etc. (Fairclough 2006: 101-105).  
 ,QPRVWHOHFWRUDOPDWHULDOV%ăVHVFXDGGUHVVHGKLVHOHFWRUDWHdirectly, often in 
highly colloquial language. On the whole, he emerged primarily as an open, 
straightforward man, with a keen sense of humour, an essentially “outlaw” character 
calling on the electorate to support him against the corrupt power system. This persona 
was very much akin to the comic characters of traditional folk-tales: the subversive 
peasant anti-hero, who, through the power of his own wit and cunning, succeeds in 
humiliating and punishing the greedy and dishonest rich. TKHGLVWDQFH %ăVHVFX WRRN
from more conventional, formal political styles, in his manner of talking and public 
behaviour, as a fundamental element of the “%ăVHVFXEUDQG”, was of a piece with the 
more general radical, anti-political variety of populism of his campaign and resonated 
well with the anti-political feelings of the Romanian electorate, with the prevailing 
orientations towards the political system of large segments of the electorate. As I will 
argue below, Băsescu’s success was partly ensured by the way in which, in his manner 
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of talking, in his behaviour, he seemed to embody or enact the (moral-political) values 
of the brand that was created for him: primarily justice (punishing the corrupt political 
system), honesty, an anti-elitism and radicalism directed at the entire political class, a 
feeling of solidarity with the population along a clearly defined “us” vs. “them” 
dividing line.3  
 
 Populism  
 
The 2004 election reconfirmed the electorate’s affinity for a “radical” form of 
populism, directed against the entire political class, i.e. for a fundamentally “anti-
political” form of protest (Mungiu-Pippidi 2002), but also for other varieties of 
populist message, most notably for a paternalist message of stability, continuity and 
social consensus.  
In the tradition inaugurated by Ionescu and Gellner (1969), there are several 
distinct ways of understanding populism: as an ideology, a pseudo-ideology, a political 
movement, a political style, a set of attitudes, etc. A widespread view is that populism 
is not an ideology in its own right, but a “syndrome” (Wiles 1969), a “meta-doctrine”, 
a “recurrent ideological structure of a very general type that can be parasitic on other 
more clearly defined doctrines and push them towards eccentric positions” ,RQLĠă
1998: 198).  Populism is also often viewed as a pathology of western democracy, a 
corrupt form of democratic ideas, and therefore a threat to a liberal-democratic society. 
 Mudde (2004) rejects the “pathology” thesis and argues that populism has now 
become mainstream in the politics of western democracies, that there is and will be a 
prevailing “populist Zeitgeist”. For Mudde, populism is an ideology, namely, “an 
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, the “pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that 
politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”. 
(Mudde 2004: 543-544). 
Jagers and Walgrave (2005) reject the ideology view of populism and suggest 
instead that populism is a “political communication style”, or a communication 
“master frame”, a way of talking about a variety of issues by appealing to and 
identifying with the people and pretending to speak in their name. As a political style 
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which merely makes reference to the people and their problems in this way (a “thin” 
conception), populism has no particular political colour, it can be either left-wing or 
right-wing. It is primarily a “conspicuous exhibition of closeness to (ordinary) 
citizens”, achieved both by talking to the public in a certain manner and by a certain 
content of discourse, i.e. by talking about the people, and thus showing care and 
concern for their problems. A “thick” conception involves two additional features: (a) 
populism gives expression to anti-establishment, anti-elite feelings, and (b) is based on 
a particular homogeneity/ exclusion logic (Jagers and Walgrave 2005: 3). 
Whatever view they take, most theorists seem to agree that some form of 
dichotomy, e.g. between “the people” and the corrupt economic or political “elite” or 
“oligarchy”, or between “the people” and some “enemy” or other, is a minimal 
characteristic of all varieties of populism. %ăVHVFX¶V populism drew very clearly on the 
dichotomy between the “people” and the ex-communist political and economic 
oligarchy in order to put forward a radical political message.  
 
 
 The argumentum ad populum as fallacy and rhetorical ploy 
 
Populism correlates most obviously with the fallacy of the argumentum ad populum, 
broadly defined as an unjustified appeal to popular sentiment or opinion. The 
argumentum ad populum may function as a “rhetorical ploy” or as a fallacious 
argument (Bowell and Kemp 2002). In the former case, it will involve a purely 
emotional (non-argumentative) appeal to the audience’s feelings and social instincts; in 
the latter case, it will involve a fallacious appeal to premises that ought not to persuade 
anyone (appeals to majority belief or to common practice). In the case of this fallacy, 
the premise that makes the argument valid, i.e. “Any belief shared by a majority of the 
people is true”, by being false, also makes it unsound.   
 In pragma-dialectics, the argumentum ad populum (the populistic fallacy) is a 
variant of the argumentum ad verecundiam (argument from authority): the authority of 
a body of people is invoked in support of a standpoint. As a fallacious argument, the 
argumentum ad populum is a violation of Rule 7 (the argument scheme rule) at the 
argumentation stage, i.e. an instance of using an inappropriate argument scheme 
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(symptomatic argumentation) by presenting the standpoint as being right or true 
because everybody (most people) think it is right or true. As a rhetorical ploy or appeal 
to emotions, the argumentum ad populum is dealt with in pragma-dialectics as a 
violation of Rule 4 at the argumentation stage (the relevance rule). It is a fallacy in 
choosing the means of defence: the standpoint is defended by non-argumentative 
means, by playing on the emotions and prejudices of an audience (a fallacy of pathos) 
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 132-135).  
 
 
Analysis: The final debate between candidates 
 
The final televised debate of the second round of the presidential campaign (the show 
DeVWLQDĠLD &RWURFHQL), hosted by the national channel TVR1 on December 8, 2004,  
included a widely commented on moment of “sincerity” or “confession”, in which 
7UDLDQ%ăVHVFXUDLVHGWKHLVVXHWKDWERWKKLPVHOIDQG$GULDQ1ăVWDVHKDGEHHQ, after 
all, “communists” before 1989. While the emergence of the topic as such was probably 
QRWDVXQSUHPHGLWDWHGDVLWVHHPHGWREHWKHZD\LQZKLFK%ăVHVFXGHYHORSHGLWZDV
an excellent illustration of the more general type of interaction with the electorate that 
he engaged in during the campaign, of the types of strategic maneuvering he pursued 
in argumentation, and of the strategies of political marketing and branding that were 
successfully employed on his behalf.  
 
 
 Strategic maneuvering in the “two communists” episode: WKH%ăVHVFXEUDQGLQDFWLRQ 
 
Here is an extract from the “two communists” episode (my translation from my own 
transcript):  
 
%ăVHVFX1R0U1ăVWDVHZHERWKKDYHDELJSUREOHPRQP\ZRUGRIKRQRXUlet's discuss it 
honestly. 
1ăVWDVH-XVWRQH" 
%ăVHVFX No, we have more, but we have one which can explain why there is so much 
passivity in the population. I don’t know why it’s occurred to me to say this … 
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1ăVWDVH%XW\RXDJUHHZLWKWKHGHFLVLRQZHKDYHWDNHQ" 
%ăVHVFX«EXW,WKLQNWKDWLQDQHOHFWRUDOUDce it can be good to say something like this. I was 
discussing it with colleagues at the beginning of the campaign. What kind of curse is there on 
this people that in the end it comes to a choice between two former communists? Between 
$GULDQ 1ăVWDVH DQG %ăsescu. In 15 years, not one man has appeared who comes from this 
world that was not touched by the vices of communism, who has not been affected by 
anything. What curse is this? And on my word of honour, I felt sorry about it. Then I kept 
looking at myself,… sometimes I was looking at myself in the mirror, and I say,  “Hey, 
%ăVHVFXROGVRQGR\RXKDYHUHVSHFWIRUWKH5RPDQLDQSHRSOH"´,ZDVDVNLQJP\VHOI,VD\
“I do.” “Have you made a mockery of the Romanian people?” I don’t have the feeling that I 
ever did that.  I think that if we think in these terms this discussion should have been – should 
not have taken place. Maybe now was the time when another type of candidate than the two of 
us should have come before the Romanians. It’s true that I did not live off political work, but I 
was a party member. But the big drama is not that I was a party member … 
1ăVWDVH,GLGQRWOLYHRIISDUW\ZRUNHLWKHU 
%ăVHVFX 1R \RX MXVW VXSSRUWHG &HDXúHVFX IRU QR UHDVRQ MXVW VR WKHUH ZRXOGQ’t be any 
opposition.  
1ăVWDVH,I\RXZDQWXVWRVWDUWWDONLQJDERXWWKLV« 
%ăVHVFX1R,GRQ’t want to talk about it.  
1ăVWDVH …. about who you were supporting when you were in Anvers, if you want 
we can talk about these details. 
%ăVHVFX:HFDQWDONDERXWLW,Q$QYHUV,ZDVVHUYLQJP\FRXQWU\ 
1ăVWDVH<RXPHQWLRQHGDSUREOHPWKDWZHKDYH/HW’s see what the problem is. 
%ăVHVFX Yes we have a problem. Do you know what the big problem is? 
1ăVWDVH7KHPLUURU 
%ăVHVFX1RWKLVZDVMXVWDTXHVWLRQ,ZDVDVNLQJP\VHOI%XWWKHELJSUREOHPWKDWZH
two have is not just that we were both party members. Maybe after all it’s not such a 
shameful evil thing to be a party member in a communist state. This is what the state 
was like at the time. The drama is that we can’t stay with the same mentalities 15 years 
after communism in Romania. And you convince me every day that you are not 
capable of understanding that these institutions have to function by themselves. (…) 
 
The “confession” moment is relevant for a certain type of criticism aimed at 
contemporary politicians: instead of substantive debate on matters of policy, they offer 
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themselves, as personalities; instead of public deliberation they exploit the attractions 
of the intimate, private sphere. Thus, discourses and arguments grounded in the private 
sphere are eroding the domain of public sphere debate, masquerading as deliberation 
(Goodnight 1982: 206). A crucial part of the success of Tony Blair’s style, for 
instance, was seen to lie in his capacity to ‘anchor’ the public politician in the ‘normal 
person’, to combine formality and informality, publicness and privateness, ceremony 
and feeling (Fairclough 2000), and the success of that highly personal style (itself part 
of the “Blair brand”) often helped to legitimize or obscure various controversial 
matters of policy.  
 In the extract above, a variety of choices in terms of discourse, genre and style 
made their own FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH RYHUDOO VXFFHVV RI %ăVHVFX¶V VHOI-)legitimation 
VWUDWHJLHVDQGWRWKHFRQVROLGDWLRQRIWKH³%ăVHVFXEUDQG´,QSDUWLFXODUKLVFKRLFHWR
frame the argument as an alleged intimate conversation with himself in front of the 
mirror, to draw on narratives of personal experience and on the colloquial register, 
together with his improvised manner of talking, created a highly reflexive, expressive 
type of political discourse, which was apparently converted by the audience into moral 
qualities of honesty, sincerity, authenticity.   
 %ăVHVFX’s manner of speaking is markedly colloquial in this extract. In 
Romanian, 0ă WX DL UHVSHFW SHQWUX SRSRUXO URPkQ %ăVHVFXOH" (‘+H\ %ăVHVFX ROG
son, do you have respect for the Romanian people?’) includes the highly informal 
interjection Pă and the inflected colloquial vocative %ăVHVFXOH. %ăVHVFXDOVRLQLWLDWHVD
shift from the second person plural to the familiar second person singular (tu, Adrian), 
and only corrects back to “0U1ăVWDVH” towards the end of the confrontation. He is 
being characteristically populist here in terms of style, not only because he exhibits a 
particularly close relationship with the audience and with his interlocutor and shows 
concern for people’s problems, but also because he deliberately suspends the normal 
rules of the political game he is involved in and, in a typically populist, anti-political 
manner, engages in man-to-man, informal conversation on an apparently highly 
personal (and apparently non-political) issue. ThroughouW WKH H[WUDFW %ăVHVFX LVQRW
fully coherent, his speech is halting, he gives the impression of searching for the right 
word without always finding it, and his body language and facial expression are 
consistent with these hesitations. He comes across as an authentic personality, a man 
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speaking from the heart in an unprepared way, who is not trying to assume an identity 
or style that does not come naturally to him. He was also perceived at the time as a 
man who is honest enough to have doubts about himself and to “confess” them in a 
public context (see also Fairclough 2006: 104-105). %\ FRQWUDVW 1ăVWDVH¶V PRUH
elegant, fluent style, his more abstract language were rejected as “arrogant” and 
perceived to be closest to the “wooden” language of communism, i.e. as language 
without a concrete referent, ultimately a form of deception.  
On the whole, as I am arguing further on, the ³%ăVHVFX EUDQG´ GUHZ RQ D
variety of populist resources, at the level of discourse (topical choices, e.g. the 
Romanian people as victim, the “us” vs. “them” dichotomy – see below), genre (e.g. 
narratives of personal experience) and style (register, body language, display of 
emotions, etc.). It is also part of the argument I am developing here that Băsescu’s 
argumentative success was to a large extent due to the particular way in which these 
resources were embedded in a coherent argumentative and political legitimation 
strategy, that benefited from effective “strategic maneuvering” (van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser 2002) and thus successfully and coherently expressed the “Băsescu brand”. 
Băsescu thus seemed to “embody” the moral-political values he claimed to stand for, 
and to naturally “inhabit” the brand that was constructed for him. 
In pragma-dialectics, strategic maneuvering is defined as the process whereby 
arguers try to maintain a balance between their so-called “rhetorical” and “dialectical” 
objectives. People engaged in argumentative discussion are viewed as oriented 
simultaneously towards concluding their differences of opinion their way (thus 
winning the argument) but also towards reaching this conclusion in a reasonable way, 
i.e. by adhering to a set of norms that define reasonable argumentation practice (van 
Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002). It is, in my view, part of the distinctiveness and 
success of the “Băsescu brand” and of Băsescu as a politician that this balance between 
potentially conflicting aims was effectively managed and maintained: Băsescu 
succeeded in persuading his audience and at the same time did not appear to disregard 
a commitment to reasonableness. This was evident in the choices that he made (or 
were made on his behalf) in terms of all the three aspects that pragma-dialectics 
discusses in connection with strategic maneuvering: topical choices (e.g. what to 
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discuss, what to leave out), adaptation to the audience (e.g. how to create empathy), 
presentational devices. 
In the extract above, effective strategic maneuvering is primarily evident in the 
ZD\ %ăVHVFX FKRRVHV WR DGGUHVV WKH WRSLF RI FRPPXQLVP DQG WKXV to create a 
confrontation that he will turn to his advantage. In pragma-dialectical terms, the 
interaction between the two participants involves four stages. At the confrontation 
VWDJH %ăVHVFX YRLFHV KLV YLHZ VWDQGSRLQW WKDW “we both have a big problem” and 
launches an invitation to his opponent to “discuss it openly”. At the opening stage, 
both participants seem to agree that there are more problems than one, yet both allow 
thHGLVFXVVLRQWRIRFXVRQWKHSUREOHPWKDW%ăVHVFXKDVGHFLGHGWRUDLVH%ăVHVFXthen 
proceeds by defining the problem (and the confrontation) in terms of a “curse” on the 
Romanian people (subsequently as a “big drama”), namely that the Romanians should 
have to choose between two former communists, that no alternative candidate has 
appeared. Once stated, the confrontation is redefined three times, and each 
confrontation is accompanied by its own argumentation VWDJH (YHU\ WLPH %ăVHVFX
acts as antagonist of his own previously stated standpoint and as protagonist of a new 
distinct standpoint. He eventually formulates the confrontation as one over mentalities: 
the “problem” (or “drama”) is that we have the same communist mentalities even 15 
years after 1989. As for who this “we” GHVLJQDWHV %ăVHVFX PDQDJHV WR LPSO\ HDFK
WLPH WKDW KH KLPVHOI LV QRW DW LVVXH WKH SUREOHP LV 1ăstase’s only. On the whole, 
WKHUHIRUH%ăVHVFXDVVXPHVDGRXEOHSURWDJRQLVW-antagonist role, repeatedly launches a 
standpoint, then challenges it and redefines it, and eventually proposes a different 
standpoint, which he supports with various types of evidence. In the reconstruction 
below, implicit (unexpressed) premises are placed between parentheses. Italicised 
sentences indicate participant roles.  
 
1. We both have a big problem: we have both been communists. %ăVHVFX DV
protagonist of a standpoint) 
 
2. (The problem is not that we have been communists in the same sense of the word). 
%ăVHVFXDVDQWDJRQLVWRIKLVRZQVWDQGSRLQW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7KHSUREOHPVLVWKDW\RX1ăVWDVHZHUHDFRPPXQLVWSURSHUO\VSHDNLQJ,ZDVMXst 
a party member.)  %ăVHVFX DV SURWDJRQLVW RI D QHZ VWDQGSRLQW UHGHILQLQJ WKH
confrontation) 
 
3.1. (I was not a communist properly speaking.) 
3.1.1. I did not live off political work.  
3.1.1.1. I was serving my country. 
3.1.1’. (A communist lives off political work.) 
 
  3.1.2. I have not made a mockery of the Romanian people.  
        3.1.2.1. I have examined  myself in the mirror. 
  3.1.2’. (Being a communist amounts to making a mockery of the people.) 
 
3.1.3. I have not failed to show respect for the people. 
3.1.3.1. I have examined myself in the mirror. 
3.1.3’. (Being a communist amounts to having no respect for the people.) 
 
3.2. (You were a communist properly speaking.) 
 3.2.1. (You lived off political work.) 
<RXVXSSRUWHG&HDXúHVFX 
 
4. The problem is not that I have been or that we have both been communist party 
members. %ăVHVFXDVDQWDJRQLVWRIKLVRZQSUHYLRXVVWDQGSRLQW 
 
4.1. It is not shameful to have been a communist party member in a communist 
state. 
4.1.1. This I what the state was like at the time. 
 
5. The problem is that we have the same communist mentalities 15 years after the fall 
of communism. %ăVHVFXDVSURWDJRQLVWRIDGLVWLQFWVWDQGSRLQWDJDLQUHGHILQLQJWKH
confrontation.) 
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5.1. (You have a problem of mentality.) 
5.1.1. You are not capable of understanding that institutions have to 
function without interference. 
5.1.1.1. There is proof for this in your everyday behaviour. 
5.1.1’. (Interfering with institutions is a symptom of a communist 
mentality). 
 
5.2. (I do not have a problem of mentality.) 
5.2.1. (I allow institutions to function without interference.) 
 
 
%ăsescu’s strategic maneuvering is particularly effective here because it draws on a 
distinction which an important segment of the electorate most certainly liked to see 
being made, i.e. between being a party member nominally (which a lot of people have 
been) and having communist attitudes and behaviour that are incompatible with 
democracy. He thus cleverly opts out of a Manichean opposition between “us” and 
“them” as “anti-communists” vs. “ex-communists” and draws the dividing line 
elsewhere, i.e. between the majority of the population (in which he includes himself) 
and the ex-communist oligarchy.   
6WUDWHJLFPDQHXYHULQJLVDOVRHIIHFWLYHLQSRVLWLRQLQJ%ăVHVFXDVQRWEHLQJDOO
that different from or better than other Romanians, while still being a “communist with 
a difference”. Such self-critical emphases are likely to increase the dialectical 
acceptability of the argument. They are cleverly balanced by a rhetoric which subtly 
IODWWHUVWKHHOHFWRUDWHDQGLQYHVWVLWZLWKWKHSRZHUWRJUDQW%ăVHVFXDVRUWRIV\PEROLF
FOHPHQF\%ăVHVFXFKRRVHVKHUH DSRVLWLRQRIPRUDO LQIHULRULW\ LW LV D“curse on the 
Romanian people”, he claims, that they should have to choose him; still, as far as bad 
FKRLFHVJR%ăVHVFXFRQVWUXFWVKLPVHOIDVWKHOHVVHUHYLOE\FRPSDULVRQZLWK1ăVWDVH
He is therefore at once constructing a victim role for the electorate, giving the 
electorate the moral high ground, and portraying himself as someone who understands 
the situation and is full of compassion (“on my honour, I was sorry for it”). All of 
these are powerful forms of ad populum appeal, part of the stock-in-trade of populist 
leaders everywhere. 
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1ăVWDVH LV PRUH UHVWUDLQHG SROLWH “if you will allow me…”) and uses 
indirectness more. Surprisingly, he allows %ăVHVFXWRJHWDZD\ZLWKYDULRXVIRUPVRI
obstructing critical discussion, among which the most glaring is the way in which he 
ends up denying his own original standpoint and its associated starting point. From: 
“we both have a problem”, i.e. “we have both been communists”, he is allowed to 
conclude that 1ăVWDVH KDV D SUREOHP WKDW 1ăVWDVH LV D FRPPXQLVW LQ WKH VHQVH RI
having a communist mentality, while he himself is not. In so doing, he is arguably 
violating Rule 6: he is denying a premise representing an accepted starting point. 
However, his repeated acknowledgement that he is a communist (albeit, as it turns out, 
in a different sense), allows this violation to go more or less unnoticed. He is also 
allowed to get away with blatantly weak or irrelevant arguments in support of the 
claim that he himself is not a communist properly speaking, e.g. because “I have 
looked at myself in the mirror”. Such argumentative support can be discussed in 
relation to pragma-dialectical Rule 2, as a violation of the obligation-to-defend rule by 
presenting a standpoint as beyond doubt or self-evident (evidence from introspection is 
here allegedly self-evident and beyond doubt).  
%ăsescu’s argumentative success in this debate is due primarily to his choice of 
the “two communists” topic, and his effective way of handling it. Not only does he 
repeatedly redefine the confrontation in his favour, but he also chooses a starting point 
that will serve his own interests best, while at the same time appearing to be operating 
with a starting point that is accepted both by himself and his interlocutor. More 
exactly, while appearing to advance the statement “we have both been communists” as 
a mutual concession or as an intersubjectively accepted starting point, he is in fact 
unobtrusively introducing a distinction between two different understandings of what a 
“communist” is and he actually ends up denying WKDWKLPVHOIDQG1ăVWDVHKDYHEHHQ
“communists” in the same sense1ăVWDVHVHHPVWREHFDXJKWRII-guard, deceived into a 
IDOVH VHQVH RI VDIHW\ E\ %ăsescu’s formulation of the starting point and of the 
confrontation and misses some good opportunities to react. Throughout the 
DUJXPHQWDWLRQVWDJH1ăstase’s restraint, his use of irony and implicit meaning, rather 
than bold, direct assertions, only damage his own rhetorical objectives, and testify to a 
poor judgment of his opponent, of what would have worked effectively with the 
audience, while also revealing his altogether different personal style.  
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Invoking the Romanian people in a victim role is a good illustration of 
%ăsescu’s typical ad populum appeals, which invoke an emotional solidarity with the 
Romanians, an “us” vs. “them” RSSRVLWLRQEHWZHHQ%ăVHVFXDQGWKHSHRSOHRQWKHRQH
KDQG DQG WKH HQWLUH SROLWLFDO V\VWHP RQ WKH RWKHU DQG OHJLWLPL]H %ăVHVFX DV
presidential candidate on the strength of premises having to do with his emotional and 
providential relation vis-à-vis the people-as-victim. References to the people and their 
sensitivities (“I have not made a mockery of the Romanian people”) may be dubious 
both as emotional, rhetorical ploys (violations of Rule 4) and as fallacious arguments, 
to the extent that implicit premises that refer to certain attitudes displayed towards “the 
people” are taken as conclusive and sufficient “signs” that a certain presidential 
candidate is the right choice (violations of Rule 7). In arguments such as these, 
strategic maneuvering gets derailed, strictly speaking, although, as I will argue below, 
the fact that it does is not necessarily obvious, or if obvious, not necessarily 
unacceptable, to the participants involved.  
One of the reasons for the above-mentioned fact could be that, while steering 
the confrontation in his favour, %ăVHVFXDSSHDUHGDW WKHVDPHWLPHWREHGULYHQE\D
sincere concern to clarify the matter under discussion, to examine it from all possible 
perspectives, and by an honest desire to get at the truth, however uncomfortable for 
himself that truth might be. He thus appeared willing to lay himself open to public 
scrutiny, without trying to hide anything about his past, and at the same time did not 
damage his credibility by making strong explicit statements about how different he 
ZDVIURP1ăVWDVH7KHEDODQFHEHWween “rhetorical” and “dialectical” objectives thus 
seemed to be masterfully maintained, or, in other words, %ăVHVFXDSSDUHQWO\PDQDJHG
to uphold a commitment to a critical ideal of reasonableness, while at the same time 
successfully pursuing his persuasive aims. The fallacious moves that took place did not 
therefore VXFFHHG LQ GDPDJLQJ WKH RYHUDOO LPSUHVVLRQ WKDW %ăVHVFX ZDV DUJXLQJ
reasonably in the context in which he found himself, by adjusting optimally to the 
situation and the audience, and upholding a commitment to reasonableness.4 
0RUHRYHUJLYHQWKHRYHUDUFKLQJSROLWLFDOJRDORIRXVWLQJ1ăVWDVHDQGWKH36'
IURPSRZHUE\ZKDWHYHUPHDQVDYDLODEOH%ăsescu’s populist style and discourse were 
welcomed, by large segments of the electorate, but, most significantly, by the anti-
communist,  liberal-democratic intellectual elites, as well-adapted to the situation in 
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Romania. Paradoxically, ad populum fallacies and other examples of fallacious 
strategic maneuvering were often perceived by otherwise highly critical people as 
reasonable contributions to the electoral campaign and effective means of persuading 
and mobilizing the electorate.  
 
 
 Legitimation and strategic maneuvering in the “supporters” video-clips 
 
In this section I will continue to look at differences in the strategies of legitimation 
used by and on behalf of the two presidential candidates in connection with a different 
type of electoral material, i.e. video-clips showing each candidate’s “supporters”, 
which were included in the final debate of December 8, 2004. I will focus on forms of 
argumentation used either by the candidates themselves or on their behalf by the 
producers of electoral material. 
In marketing, in general, products can be advertised through “endorsement” by 
famous personalities. In electoral campaigns, the campaign staff and other supporters 
form a “symbolic entourage” meant to give credibility to a candidate. 
Argumentatively, this can correlate with appeals to authority (the symbolic authority 
of cultural personalities, politicians) and ad populum appeals (to popularity, or to the 
feelings, emotions, enthusiasms of the audience).  
 Marketing research is generally used to identify and anticipate the wants and 
needs of the public, and political marketing involves an identification of the wants and 
needs of voters (citizens). The “product” it develops is a manufactured image based on 
adapting the candidate’s political platform, ideology, values, personal qualities, record 
of achievements, etc. to these alleged wants and needs. The political marketing 
undertaken in support of the two candidates seems to correlate here with a problem-
solution argumentative topos, in which voting for one or another candidate is presented 
as a “solution” to people’s “problems”.  
 I am drawing here on a view of argumentation on normative matters which 
regards ought-claims (“we ought to vote for x”) as being made on the basis of at least 
two types of premises, which define (a) the (allegedly) factual circumstances (i.e. the 
problems people have, as well as the candidate’s qualities and areas of competence) (b) 
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a normative ideal in view of which the ought-claim is made (Kratzer 1991). Such 
arguments seem to have the following form: given people’s problems, as well as the 
candidate’s ability to satisfy them (circumstantial premises), given what people want, 
i.e. that problems should bee solved (normative premise), and given that, if people 
want their problems solved, they should vote for that candidate (warrant), it follows 
that it is necessary/ recommended that people vote for that candidate (claim). I am 
interested in differences between the two campaigns in terms of what problems were 
recognized and attributed to the public (in circumstantial premises) and what problems 
were obscured, of how the problems that were recognized were related to the images 
that were manufactured for the candidates and to the particular qualities and abilities 
that were emphasized, and in terms of what normative ideals (what aims, needs or 
wishes) were invoked on behalf of the people (in normative premises).  
A striking difference between the two video-clips is that while %ăVHVFX¶V 
supporters were SXEOLF SHUVRQDOLWLHV PRVW RI 1ăstase’s were SHDVDQWV 1ăstase’s 
campaign makers obviously acted on the fundamental premise that in a country with 
over 40% rural population, a presidential candidate can only win by effectively 
mobLOL]LQJWKHUXUDOYRWH1ăVWDVHis described in the video-clip as “competent” (he has 
“training”, “culture”, “moral rectitude”, “experience”, he is a “good politician” and a 
“good leader”, etc.), he was also repeatedly associated with  Romania’s European 
“future”. On this basis, his supporters legitimized the claim that people should vote for 
him. Many superlatives were used: he is “the best”, he is “very, very good”, “the only 
one” who can do various things. It was however the purely emotional arguments (often 
verging on the irrational) that were really noticeable in 1ăVWDVH¶V“supporters” clip, e.g. 
in the intervention of a peasant woman shown KROGLQJ1ăstase’s portrait to her chest 
and saying: “I don’W ZDQW DQ\ERG\ EXW 0U 1ăVWDVH , GRQ’t need a pension, I don’t 
need anything, I only want to see him and talk to him«$GULDQ1ăVWDVH«P\RZQ
soul”, or of another peasant woman saying: “He has a beauty, he has a power bestowed 
on him by God to lead the people”.  
Arguments based heavily on ad populum and emotional appeal were used to 
construct the image of a paternalist and almost messianic leader, loved and worshipped 
by a pre-modern, parochial and infantilized population in exchange for care and 
protection. 1ăVWDVH¶VDSSHDOLQWKH³UXUDO´VHTXHQFHVRIWKHYLGHR-clip was primarily of 
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a charismatic type, his presence seemed to create a state of grace in which all needs 
other than emotional ones were suspended. The legitimizing argument in support of 
1ăVWDVHKDG the following form: given (1) people’VSUREOHPV 1ăstase’s qualities 
and (3) people’s normative ideals (their wants, needs, aims), it follows WKDW1ăVWDVHLV
the best option. Interestingly, ZKLOHSUHPLVHVUHIHUULQJWR1ăstase’s personal qualities 
were numerous, premises referring to current problems such as poverty or corruption 
were practically absent. People’s main problem seemed to be the absence of a 
competent leader, of a man capable of fulfilling their emotional needs, their needs for 
protection and symbolic representation. Judging from what they said, people did not 
seem to be worried much about poverty and daily survival, or about the present. 
Factual premises involving economic problems were absent,  and presumably not 
because of lack of “market research” or failure in tuning the candidate’s message to 
real needs (although this is also possible), but in order  to give prominence to assumed 
problems, needs and wants which matched  1ăstase’s real strengths (e.g. in foreign 
policy). Premises specifying normative ideals were also mainly implicit.  The only 
explicit normative ideal was the grand political vision in incumbent President Ion 
Iliescu’s final endorsement – “… a Romania that is more prosperous and more 
respected, a Romania that is equal amongst the European nations”. However, neither 
the diagnosed “problems”, nor this particular normative vision seemed particularly 
plausible reconstructions of the Romanian people’VMXVWLILFDWLRQVLQYRWLQJIRU1ăVWDVH
at the time of the 2004 election.  
%ăVHVFX¶V campaign, by contrast, was mainly oriented towards the urban 
population and especially towards relatively young, educated voters, hence the   
humorous, playful tone of the campaign and the wide use of intertextuality and parody. 
%ăVHVFX¶V supporters in the video-clip were not anonymous peasants, they were either 
well-known public personalities or faces that people would have recognized from the 
leaflets that were used in the campaign. Instead of argumentation ad populum based on 
the authority of an anonymous collective body of people, there was rather an argument 
from the authority of specific individuals. Or, to be more exact, an argument from 
authority involving well-known personalities was combined with a modified version of 
an argumentum ad populum, based on a claim to representativeness of a set of ordinary 
people.  Among the most interesting elements of strategic maneuvering was the 
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absence of superODWLYHV%ăVHVFXZDV not “the best”, but a decent candidate, therefore a 
fallible human being, an ordinary man. Humour was used extensively, for instance in 
ex-dissident poet Mircea Dinescu’s intervention, in the use of two metonymies: the 
Black Sea (an allusion to %ăVHVFX¶V career as a sea-captain) vs. &DUWLHUXO3ULPăYHULL 
(the residential area of the communist nomenklatura, ZKLFK 1ăVWDVH ZDV GLUHFWO\
associated with): “If you have confidence in me, vote like me, for 7UDLDQ %ăVHVFX
because it would be the first time in the history of Romania when the Black Sea might 
defeat &DUWLHUXO3ULPăYHULL”. 
%ăVHVFX¶V supporters seemed to value primarily his moral qualities: his 
honesty, fairness, trustworthiness, the fact that he cared for others, his integrity, his 
moral strength, his sense of responsibility, his sense of humour. The legitimizing 
DUJXPHQW IRU %ăVHVFX VHHPHG to be of the following type: given what the 
circumstances are (implicit references to injustice, corruption, inefficiency of 
LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGJLYHQWKDW%ăVHVFXFDQVROYHWKHVHSUREOHPVDVWKHWHVWLPRQLHVWRKLV
qualities indicate), also given the normative ideal of a “decent” country where “we can 
all breathe” and live, where things get done and justice is done (this is what people 
DOOHJHGO\ZDQW%ăVHVcu is the best option. There was a clear difference between the 
two normative ideals proposed by the two candidates: a grandiose and abstract future 
vision for Romania under the leadership of a charismatic and paternalist superlative 
leader, on the one hand, and the more down-to-earth, pragmatic vision of a merely 
“decent” country, where politicians are honest and carry out their electoral promises, 
on the other. In %ăVHVFX¶V clip there were no references to the distant future, nor to 
Europe, but only to current domestic problems. There was no mention of God either, 
and the heavy-KDQGHG DSSHDO WR HPRWLRQ LQ 1ăstase’s clip is replaced by a subtle 
appeal to humour and to a feeling of in-group solidarity with members of Romania’s 
intellectual elite. %ăVHVFX¶V electoral message in this particular video-clip seemed on 
the whole to be conceived for a modern, not pre-modern society, aimed at and 
legitimized by individual and responsible citizens, not by a generic anonymous 
electorate.  
More generally, various forms of strategic maneuvering were evident in the 
choice of campaign themes (as “topical choices”) for all sorts of electoral material: 
each candidate addressed those topics that were most advantageous to him, each 
 19 
deployed a variety of rhetorical presentation devices, of which for instance humour (in 
%ăVHVFX¶V campaign) turned out to be extremely effective, each sought particular ways 
of adapting to what were perceived to be the electorate’s needs and concerns. The main 
VORJDQRI1ăstase’s campaign, for instance, was Faptele sunt politica mea (“Actions 
are my politics”), accompanied by a constant reiteration of political and economic 
achievements. However, as I have said, excessive emphasis on foreign policy 
achievements and issues of symbolic representation gave the strange impression that 
these, not the economic situation, were the major issues of concern for the population. 
To the extent that a whole range of real problems were obscured and a whole range of 
potential differences of opinion were not brought into the open, the overall strategy 
was open to the charge of fallaciousness, seen as obstruction of reasonable discussion 
or derailment from critical conduct. 
2QWKHZKROHZKLOH1ăVWDVHHPHUJHGDVDSDWHUQDOLVt leader in terms of social 
VWDELOLW\DQGFRQVHQVXV%ăVHVFXZDVFRQVWUXFWHGDVDSURYLGHQWLDOOHDGHUDQGVDYLRXU
of his nation in times of crisis. By drawing excessively on a paternalist type of 
populism and disregarding corruption and poverty issues, 1ăVtase’s campaign 
achieved a relatively poor adaptation to audience demand.  %ăVHVFX’s radical, 
authoritarian message, on the other hand, showed considerable sensitivity to the 
concerns of the electorate, not least of all by claiming that there were radical and quick 
solutions for them. Better adaptation to audience expectations, better use of 
presentational devices (notably, the use of humour, of the colloquial register, etc.) and 
more relevant topical choices (i.e., corruption, not foreign policy), as elements of 
successful strategic maneuvering, all contributed to the success of WKH³%ăVHVFX brand” 
and to its electoral success in the campaign. The context of perceived acute crisis in 
Romania also played a crucial part. It was in part due to contextual factors that a 
variety of argumentative moves that might have otherwise been perceived as 
questionable tended to go unnoticed or to be perceived as reasonable, as being well-
adjusted to the demands of the Romanian context. 
 Differences between argumentation strategies in the “supporters” video-clips 
can also be taken to indicate different assessments of the “political culture” (Almond 
and Verba 1963/1996) of the Romanian population by political advisors and campaign 
VWDII 1ăVWDVH¶V electoral message seemed to be predominantly intended for an 
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electorate that shared a “parochial” type of political culture. The “subject” type was 
addressed in terms of a promise to continue the gradual measures aimed at relieving 
SRYHUW\ E\ 1ăVWDVH DQG E\ D SOHGJH E\ %ăVHVFX WR “crush” the corrupt political 
system that was responsible for poverty. %ăVHVFX¶VFDPSDLJQVKRZHGEHWWHUDGDSWDWLRQ
to a wider variety of segments of the electorate and types of political culture. This 
included a “participant” type of political culture, i.e. a segment of the electorate who 
did not necessarily share a strong commitment to liberal-democratic values but who in 
WKH HQG YRWHG IRU %ăVHVFX RQ WKH VWUHQJWK RI KLV UDGLFDOLVP DQG DXWKRULWDULDQLVP DV
well as a radicalized liberal-democratic segment, wKRYRWHGIRU%ăVHVFXHLWKHURXWRI
conviction or for primarily pragmatic reasons, hoping for radical change in the spirit of 
liberal democracy. This latter type of voters, in principle critical of and not easily 
swayed by populistic appeals, suspended theiUFULWLFDOVWDQFHDQGVXSSRUWHG%ăVHVFX¶V
campaign as one which served a perceived “reasonable” and “constructive” purpose in 
the context it was meant address: a situation of crisis, a predominantly parochial and 
dependent electorate with inertial politicaO RSWLRQV7KLVZRXOG H[SODLQZK\ %ăVHVFX
ZDVDOVRPDVVLYHO\VXSSRUWHGE\WKHLQWHOOHFWXDOVZKRGLGQRWVHHPWRPLQG%ăVHVFX¶V
frequent “derailments” from critical conduct, but chose to back him unconditionally 
given the overall political goals he embodied.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
My analysis has suggested that one candidate in the Romanian presidential election, 
7UDLDQ %ăVHVFX ZDV DEOH WR JDLQ D VPDOO EXW GHFLVLYH HOHFWRUDO DGYDQWDJH IURP D
campaign which appropriated and implemented strategies for political marketing in a 
more sophisticated and effective way than the campaign of his main opponent, as well 
as using a strategy for political branding. I have partly related the success of the 
“Băsescu brand” to more effective strategic maneuvering in argumentation: the choices 
that were made in terms of what issues to address, how to address them, how to best 
adapt to audience demand (all drawing on certain varieties of populism), but also the 
way in which a commitment to reasonableness and to the norms of critical discussion 
was effectively maintained, all contributed to strengthening and expressing the brand 
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DQG WKHYDOXHV%ăVHVFX FODLPHG WR VWDQG IRU ,W LVSDUWO\ WKDQNV WR HIIHFWLYH VWUDWHJLF
maneuvering that  Băsescu  emerged as credibly and coherently embodying these 
values. I have also related Basescu’s electoral success to factors having to do with the 
Romanian political and economic context at the time of the elections, a situation of 
perceived crisis, and to features of the political culture of the electorate. Finally, I have 
suggested that argumentative moves which, in other circumstances or for other 
audiences, might have been considered at least questionable, if not downright 
fallacious, were not necessarily perceived as such by significant sections of the 
electorate, or, if they were, the fact was not necessarily relevant in terms of voting 
behaviour. Basescu’s populist style, the populist legitimation strategies deployed on 
his behalf were, rather, considered to be reasonable and effective adaptations to the 
context, to the Romanian electorate and to the overall political goals that he embodied. 
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1
 The earliest version of this paper was read at the International Conference on Critical Discourse 
Analysis organized by the University of Athens, May 20-21, 2005.  Another version has appeared in the 
journal Studies in Language and Capitalism (,HĠFX-Fairclough 2007).  
 
2
 A number of other CDA practitioners are using various versions of argumentation theory, e.g. Wodak 
et al (1999), Reisigl (forthcoming) or, most recently, Richardson (2007), who is specifically drawing on 
pragma-dialectics. For reasons of space, I will not include here a discussion of the analytical framework 
of either CDA or pragma-GLDOHFWLFV)RUVXFKDGLVFXVVLRQVHH,HĠFX-)DLUFORXJKDQG,HĠFXE
2006c). 
 
3
 The most significant public debate on branding in Romania has been about the country brand and the 
need to “re-brand” it. Several attempts so far, e.g. the 2004 campaign, “Romania. Simply Surprising”,  
 25 
                                                                                                                                                                        
and the more recent, 2007 campaign, “Romania. Fabulospirit”, have been widely criticized and ridiculed 
by the Romanians themselves as failing to capture and express any recognizable sense of Romanian 
identity.  
 
4
 I am drawing here on a functional, contextual view of  fallacies (Jacobs 2002) that looks at messages, 
in their context, as fallacious or not. On this view, argumentative effectiveness (and presumably, 
acceptability) is tied to the satisfaction of “public interests” such as the “achievement of reasonable 
decision-making” in a given context. Rhetorical strategies that might conventionally be classified as 
fallacious can be thus perceived as pragmatically adequate, moreover as reasonable (non-fallacious), 
given the particular characteristics of the context and of the audience, and the goals pursued by the 
arguers. They may thus function as “constructive contributions” to the decision-making process, e.g. 
may clarify what is at issue in more effective ways than “non-fallacious” argumentation. (Jacobs 2002: 
124-125). 
 
